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it is worth noting that Yandell himself admits that his discussion of most of the
issues in his book is not conclusive. But the difficulties in reaching justified
conclusions on these matters contribute to the difficulty in showing that one
conceptual system, in contrast to all the others, is justified. Yet showing this is
required to make an adequate response to the challenges of skepticism and
relativism.

Kierkegaard's Dialectic of Inwardness: A Structural Analysis of the Theory of
Stages, by Stephen N. Dunning. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985.
323 pp. + vii. $32.
C. STEPHEN EVANS, St. Olaf College.
Kierkegaard's Dialectic of Inwardness is an original, well-written study of Kierkegaard as a dialectical thinker. Dunning's book is a direct challenge to the
thesis of Niels Thulstrup (in Kierkegaard's Relation to Hegel) that Kierkegaard
owes virtually nothing to HegeL Dunning thinks that Kierkegaard's work "lends
itself' to a systematic, structural analysis. Despite the fact that the content of
Kierkegaard's work is so often anti-Hegelian, Dunning tries to show that the
form of Kierkegaard's work is Hegelian or at least similar to Hegel. Of course
from a Hegelian standpoint, at least, the relation between form and content
suggests that the opposition to the content of Hegel's philosophy may not be so
absolute and unqualified as many have thought.
Dunning recognizes that there are different kinds of dialectic. He wishes to
focus specifically on the type of dialectic exemplified in Hegel, with three
characteristic "moments." The first moment is one characterized as "in-itself,"
and generally connotes immediacy and externality. The second, or "for itself'
moment, is associated with reflection, inwardness, and negativity. The third or
"in and for itself' moment, is supposed to resolve the tension between the first
two by incorporating their "truth" and suppressing what is partial and one-sided
in each. This third moment then begins the cycle anew.
After an initial look at The Concept of Irony as an illustration of what is meant
by dialectical thinking, and as evidence that Kierkegaard was trained in this kind
of thinking, Dunning embarks on an analysis of the theory of the stages on life's
way, as this theory is exemplified in the pseudonymous authorship from Either-Or
to the Concluding Unscientific Postscript. In typical Hegelian fashion Dunning
finds tripartite structures within tripartite structures. The three stages are understood in Hegelian fashion. Each stage in tum is analyzed as consisting ofthree-fold
movements. Movements are in their tum analyzed as composed of moments, and
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sometimes moments are analyzed into three phases, and phases into points.
The book concludes with a similar analysis of the Sickness Unto Death and
Training in Christianity. Dunning views these works as rich mines of dialectical
ore, and he claims to have shown, therefore, that even in the later Christian
"second literature" Kierkegaard continued to think dialectically. Curiously,
though, he says that these later dialectical progressions cannot be incorporated
into the dialectic of the stages (p. 240). If one grants, however, that religiousness
B of the stages is Christianity, then it is hard to see why this is so. A little of
the ingenuity Dunning displays elsewhere in the book would surely suffice to
show some relations here.
Certain kinds of obvious objections to Dunning's work are forestalled by his
explicit adoption of a structural approach. That is, Dunning brackets questions
of authorial intention and meaning to focus on the texts themselves. It is, therefore,
not significant whether or not Kierkegaard intended to construct a progressive,
systematic dialectic. In fact, Dunning actually claims that Kierkegaard is usually
not consciously aware of the dialectical structures he uncovers, and cites their
deep, implicit status as evidence for this claim. This fact is used to argue against
a rival explanation of the dialectical structures: that they are ironic or playful
satires of Hegel (p. 5).
There are two dialectical motifs which Dunning sees as permeating Kierkegaard's authorship. The first and dominant one is the dialectic of inwardness
and outwardness-the relation between inner intention and passion and its outer
expression in action. This dialectic is seen pre-eminently in Either-Or and the
Concluding Unscientific Postscript, but it is also very significant in Fear and
Trembling, Repetition, and The Stages on Life's Way.
The other dialectical theme is concerned with the relation of the self to an
other, and it is seen as very prominent in the Stages, the Postscript, and The
Concept ()f Anxiety, and is an important if not dominant theme in several other
works.
One of the genuinely important accomplishments of Dunning's work is that
it does force us to recognize that Kierkegaard is not simply a philosopher of
inwardness and "the solitary individual." I found Dunning's overall dialectical
structure somewhat contrived, and there were many places where I felt the text
was being wrestled into a procrustean, dialectical bed. Nevertheless, Dunning's
method does help one to see pervasive themes that are otherwise easily missed.
I think he is quite right to stress that Kierkegaard is concerned with the relation
of inwardness to its outer expression. He is also quite right in stressing that
Kierkegaard's understanding of selfhood is, like Hegel's, fundamentally social
and relational. The disagreement with Hegel is that Kierkegaard sees God as a
genuine individual who can and should function as "the other," not simply as
an ideal reality known in and through the human community.
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In terms of the analyses of individual works, I found the explorations of the
earlier pseudonymous writings (Either-Or, Fear and Trembling and particularly
The Concept of Anxiety) to be more illuminating than the work on the Climacus
literature. However, even in the latter case Dunning's original approach continually produced provocative new insights and perspectives on familiar texts. All
in all, this is a first-rate piece of work-well conceived and carried through.

A Christian View of Justice, by Mark T. Coppenger. Nashville, Tenn.:
Broadman Press, 1983, 173 pages, no index, Paper $6.95.
DAVID A. HOEKEMA, University of Delaware.
Mark Coppenger, a former member of the philosophy faculty at Wheaton College
in Illinois who left the academic world a few years ago to prepare for the ministry,
undertakes in the book under review to relate the pressing questions of social
justice to the theological commitments of evangelical Protestantism. It is a book
which will appeal both to Professor Coppenger's former philosophy students and
to the Reverend Coppenger's parishioners.
Encompassing a wide range of issues in a small book, Coppenger has chosen
to keep his discussion on a relatively elementary level. The five chapters of the
book resemble a series of lectures which might be offered in an undergraduate
course in an evangelical college, and perhaps this resemblance is more than
coincidental. In the first chapter, Coppenger argues that the fatherhood of God
provides the essential foundation for any Christian moral or political theory. A
"father model" of ethics, he urges, rules out either hedonistic utilitarianism or
strict deontological ethics. God demands obedience but at the same time intends,
and ensures, human happiness in the deepest sense. In a second chapter Coppenger
argues that, when we examine those moral issues which are issues of social
justice, the concept of desert provides a basis on which we build the principles
of a just social order.
In the third chapter Coppenger describes what he terms a "matrix that distinguishes among benefits and harms according to whether an individual deserves
to receive or suffer them. Each of the four categories of this schema-deserved
benefit, deserved harm, undeserved benefit, undeserved harm--calls for a particular response from governmental institutions. For example, governments have
a duty to inflict certain kinds of harm on those who deserve it, and this is the
essential character of punishment. Social institutions must also try to prevent
undeserved harm. Widows and orphans, impoverished children, and others who
are the victims of undeserved harm should receive benefits from the state--even

